Theoretical model of exploitative leadership in collective violence in animal societies
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- Metadata Language
- English (en)
- Character set
- utf8
- Dataset Reference Date ()
- 2022-08-31
- Identifier
- doi: / 10.5285/7aab999e-cef9-41c2-8400-63f10af798ec
- Other citation details
- Johnstone, R.A., Thompson, F.J., Cant, M.A (2022). Theoretical model of exploitative leadership in collective violence in animal societies. NERC EDS Environmental Information Data Centre 10.5285/7aab999e-cef9-41c2-8400-63f10af798ec
- GEMET - INSPIRE themes, version 1.0 ()
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- Habitats and Biotopes
- Keywords
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- Collective violence
- Intergroup conflict
- Social evolution
- Game theory
- Aggression
- Limitations on Public Access
- otherRestrictions
- Other constraints
- no limitations
- Use constraints
- otherRestrictions
- Use constraints
- otherRestrictions
- Other constraints
- If you reuse this data, you should cite: Johnstone, R.A., Thompson, F.J., Cant, M.A (2022). Theoretical model of exploitative leadership in collective violence in animal societies. NERC EDS Environmental Information Data Centre https://doi.org/10.5285/7aab999e-cef9-41c2-8400-63f10af798ec
- Topic category
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- Society
Distribution Information
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txt
()
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txt
()
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- Quality Scope
- application
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- application
Report
- Dataset Reference Date ()
- 2010-12-08
- Statement
- Our model extends the classic hawk-dove model to consider pairwise encounters between groups of size n. In each encounter, an individuals is randomly selected as leader and the rest of the group assigned as followers. The leader decides whether the group collectively adopts either aggressive (hawk) or peaceful (dove) tactics, via their disproportionate influence on group behaviour. Total fitness payoffs to groups are identical to that of individuals in the classic model, except that we also allow for unequal sharing. Each follower’s share of the benefit obtained from fighting is reduced compared to that of their leader, while the leader’s share of any costs incurred is reduced compared to that of a follower. Our model predicts that extreme levels of intergroup aggression will evolve when a subset of group members can initiate conflicts that involve the whole group and when initiators gain a disproportionate benefit (or suffer lower costs) than others. It suggests that destructive warfare can result from the decoupling of leaders from the costs that they incite.
Metadata
- File identifier
- 7aab999e-cef9-41c2-8400-63f10af798ec XML
- Metadata Language
- English (en)
- Character set
- ISO/IEC 8859-1 (also known as Latin 1)
- Resource type
- application
- Hierarchy level name
- application
- Metadata Date
- 2022-08-31T11:53:28
- Metadata standard name
- UK GEMINI
- Metadata standard version
- 2.3